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The 'costs' of showing Iran that the US is determined ...'
FLC
(Begin here with
the
Benefits,)
"...
Costs:
In addition to the financial costs of conducting military attacks
against Iran,
which would be significant (particularly if the U.S. had to
carry out thousands of sorties and if it had to return to the use of force
periodically for years to come), there would likely be near-term costs
associated with Iranian retaliation, through both direct and surrogate
asymmetrical attacks. Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over
the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global
and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation,
action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that
would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out
regional war.
Among the potential costs discussed in this paper are the
following:
*Direct Iranian retaliation against the
U.S.
While some argue that Iran might hold back using force in order
to avoid provoking a larger scale conflict, we believe that Iran would retaliate,
costing American lives; damaging U.S. facilities in the region; and affecting
U.S. interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf, and elsewhere. Iran would draw on
its
extensive conventional rocket capability and IRGC anti-ship missiles,
small submarines, fast attack boats, and mine warfare in the Gulf. Iran might
attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, which could rattle global markets and
cause a significant spike in oil prices (as well as blocking the main artery for
export of Iran’s own oil).
*Iranian strikes against Israel.
Iran would hold Israel partly responsible for any
attacks, whether or not
Israel participated in military action. While Israel's
anti-missile and
civilian defense programs are strong, sustained air strikes by Iran would result
in casualties and damage to facilities, perhaps including the Israeli
nuclear complex in Dimona.
*Indirect retaliation by Iran.
Attacks by well-armed proxies such as Hezbollah
or Shiite militant groups in
Iraq, as well as by Iran’s covert forces and the IRGC
Qods Force, could be
even more damaging to U.S. and Israeli interests than direct Iranian
retaliation. Such indirect retaliation could include the use of missiles and
rockets by proxies as well as terrorist attacks and covert action, such as
sabotage and assassination. If Hezbollah were to make heavy use of the missiles
and rockets it has deployed in southern Lebanon, that could expand the conflict,
possibly leading to a regional war in the Levant.
*A potential breakdown of hard-won global solidarity
against Iran’s nuclear
program. We believe that if Iran is attacked by
the US or Israel in the absence of an international mandate or a multinational
coalition, support for
support for to Iran that are now prohibited by
sanctions could resume, as might the sale of materials that could be used for
making a nuclear weapon.
*Global
political and economic instability, including disruptions in
energy supply and security. A U.S. and/or Israeli attack
on Iran could introduce
destabilizing political and economic forces in a
region already experiencing major transformations. In addition to costing the
U.S. economy hundreds of billions of dollars yearly, a sustained conflict would
boost the price of oil and further disrupt an already fragile world
economy
*Damage to the United States’ global reputation and increased
credibility for anti-American extremist groups. U.S.
military action, especially if unilateral, could further alienate Muslims and
others worldwide, reinforcing the view that the United States resorts too often
to military force. An attack on a Muslim nation could enhance the recruiting
ability of radical Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda. Even though some Sunni
Muslims might be pleased to see attacks on Shiite Iran, the likely impact on
U.S. stature in the Muslim world would be negative.
On the contested issue of
whether military action would weaken or strengthen
Iranian public support for
the current regime, we conclude that U.S. and/or Israeli strikes are more likely to unify the population behind the government
than to generate
resistance.Some of these costs would be mitigated if a U.S. strike
were to occur in response to Iranian actions that clearly revealed an intention
to develop a nuclear weapon. Such actions might include the expulsion of IAEA
inspectors and withdrawal from the NPT, or the launch of a crash program to
raise existing supplies of low- and medium-enriched uranium to a weapons-grade
level of enrichment. Given the time required for Iran to progress from the
decision to weaponize to possession of a reliable, deliverable weapon, the
United States would have an opportunity to develop international support for
multilateral action against Iran, including further sanctions, additional
negotiations, and the use of military force. While the costs associated with
Iranian retaliation would not significantly be altered if other nations approved
or joined in a U.S. military strike, the longer-term costs to U.S. interests
would be somewhat lessened...."
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