34 Years on War, 'Partnership' Continues to Divide Lebanese!
Hussein Assi Readers Number : 97
14/04/2009 Thirty-four years have passed…
Thirty-four years have passed since a disastrous war erupted in Lebanon, devastating the country for 15 years from which the Lebanese have not fully recovered…
Thirty-four years have passed, but, given the current political divisions on the eve of "exceptional" parliamentary elections in which the mere slogan of "partnership" seems to be a source of conflict, the war's revelations and manifestations continue to emerge…
Thirty-four years have passed… Yet, April 13 cannot be a usual day in Lebanon. It's true that the page of the war was brought to an end with tens of thousands of victims, handicapped and missing persons…
Nevertheless, under the general principle "let's recall (the war) to prevent (its) repetition," the Lebanese commemorate this day, recalling the war's negative aspects and insisting on the necessity of national unity as the only path to save Lebanon from evil hands.
Indeed, one of the main motives of the 'civil' war was the philosophy of 'partnership' among Lebanese. At the time, the problem of monopoly and hegemony emerged when Maronite Christians took hold of the rule, pushing the national movement's coalition, headed by Kamal Jumblatt, to a confrontation that aimed to achieve partnership but resulted in sedition.
Yet, the beginning was marked with blood on April 13 when Christian militiamen machine-gunned a bus carrying Palestinians through Ain al-Remmaneh (east of Beirut) killing 27 passengers. The attack came as retaliation to killing a Lebanese Christian outside a nearby church. As if everything was prepared: rival clans spread throughout the city within hours. Homes became garrisons and streets became green and battlefields lines controlled by militias.
In June, 1976, then President Suleiman Franjieh called for a Syrian intervention on the grounds that the port of Beirut was risking closure. Syrian troops, then called the deterrent force in the framework of the Arab deterrent forces, succeeded in imposing order, giving Lebanon a brief respite from war. The nation was effectively divided, with southern Lebanon and the western half of Beirut becoming bases for the Palestine Liberation Organization and Muslim-based groups, while the Christians controlled west Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon. The main confrontation line in divided Beirut was known as the Green Line.
Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Then Prime Minister Rashid Karami who was the head of a national unity government, was assassinated on June 1, 1987, by Lebanese forces chief Samir Geagea. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel Aoun as acting Prime Minister, contravening the National Pact. Fearing he might loose his control of eastern Beirut, especially after getting rid of all his allies, namely the Nationalist Liberal Party and the forces of Elie Hobeika, Geagea got engaged with a war with the Lebanese Army under Aoun's command. It was called the "war of elimination."
On March 14, 1989, Aoun launched what he termed as "war of liberation" against Syrian forces. It was the last battle in the civil war era. At that time, the name "Taef Agreement" was becoming more familiar to the Lebanese.
The Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and included Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, began to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The Agreement recognized that Christians no longer formed a majority of the population and stipulated that Christians and Muslims would have an equal number of seats in parliament, which were increased from 99 to 108 (and later to 128). The agreement left the presidency as a Christian position. Because Muslims were critical of a Christian presidency, the Lebanese government that formed after the Agreement amended the constitution to lessen presidential authority. As a result, the president was required to consult the House Speaker (a Shia Muslim) as well as members of the National Assembly before naming a prime minister (a Sunni Muslim), and the president's power to dismiss ministers was transferred to the cabinet. Aoun rejected these amendments and launched another rebellion in 1990. Syria, however, quickly suppressed his move, thus ending the civil war in October 1990, and set about rebuilding the Lebanese army and imposing political reform.
Nevertheless, the concept of "democracy of consensus" that appeared on the top of the Constitution remained a source of contradiction, mainly in its interpretation. This concept, as well as the whole concept of partnership, continued to be the main source of internal conflicts that emerge from one time to another in the country.
This concept in fact was behind the fierce division that the Lebanese witnessed following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. It was a sharp turn in Lebanon’s political life that gave birth to two main political blocs that differ in everything, even in defining partnership. The mentioned division even put Lebanon, once again, on the verge of abyss when an unconstitutional government, headed by Fouad Saniora, was formed without the representation of Shiite Muslims, symbolizing again the dangerous concept of monopolization in the diversified country.
In conclusion, and while the older generation is disillusioned with war, there is fear that the younger generation is more than willing to take up arms, unaware of the repercussions of such decision. Moreover, the conflicts among Lebanese, on the eve of an electoral battle set to take place on June 7, don't assume an assuring role. The electoral platforms are more than a proof when a political bloc declares publicly that it rejects partnership, despite the fact that all estimations foresee that the upcoming "parliamentary majority" wouldn't exceed the "parliamentary minority" by more than the hand's fingers.
Hussein Assi Readers Number : 97
14/04/2009 Thirty-four years have passed…
Thirty-four years have passed since a disastrous war erupted in Lebanon, devastating the country for 15 years from which the Lebanese have not fully recovered…
Thirty-four years have passed, but, given the current political divisions on the eve of "exceptional" parliamentary elections in which the mere slogan of "partnership" seems to be a source of conflict, the war's revelations and manifestations continue to emerge…
Thirty-four years have passed… Yet, April 13 cannot be a usual day in Lebanon. It's true that the page of the war was brought to an end with tens of thousands of victims, handicapped and missing persons…
Nevertheless, under the general principle "let's recall (the war) to prevent (its) repetition," the Lebanese commemorate this day, recalling the war's negative aspects and insisting on the necessity of national unity as the only path to save Lebanon from evil hands.
Indeed, one of the main motives of the 'civil' war was the philosophy of 'partnership' among Lebanese. At the time, the problem of monopoly and hegemony emerged when Maronite Christians took hold of the rule, pushing the national movement's coalition, headed by Kamal Jumblatt, to a confrontation that aimed to achieve partnership but resulted in sedition.
Yet, the beginning was marked with blood on April 13 when Christian militiamen machine-gunned a bus carrying Palestinians through Ain al-Remmaneh (east of Beirut) killing 27 passengers. The attack came as retaliation to killing a Lebanese Christian outside a nearby church. As if everything was prepared: rival clans spread throughout the city within hours. Homes became garrisons and streets became green and battlefields lines controlled by militias.
In June, 1976, then President Suleiman Franjieh called for a Syrian intervention on the grounds that the port of Beirut was risking closure. Syrian troops, then called the deterrent force in the framework of the Arab deterrent forces, succeeded in imposing order, giving Lebanon a brief respite from war. The nation was effectively divided, with southern Lebanon and the western half of Beirut becoming bases for the Palestine Liberation Organization and Muslim-based groups, while the Christians controlled west Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon. The main confrontation line in divided Beirut was known as the Green Line.
Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Then Prime Minister Rashid Karami who was the head of a national unity government, was assassinated on June 1, 1987, by Lebanese forces chief Samir Geagea. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel Aoun as acting Prime Minister, contravening the National Pact. Fearing he might loose his control of eastern Beirut, especially after getting rid of all his allies, namely the Nationalist Liberal Party and the forces of Elie Hobeika, Geagea got engaged with a war with the Lebanese Army under Aoun's command. It was called the "war of elimination."
On March 14, 1989, Aoun launched what he termed as "war of liberation" against Syrian forces. It was the last battle in the civil war era. At that time, the name "Taef Agreement" was becoming more familiar to the Lebanese.
The Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and included Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, began to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The Agreement recognized that Christians no longer formed a majority of the population and stipulated that Christians and Muslims would have an equal number of seats in parliament, which were increased from 99 to 108 (and later to 128). The agreement left the presidency as a Christian position. Because Muslims were critical of a Christian presidency, the Lebanese government that formed after the Agreement amended the constitution to lessen presidential authority. As a result, the president was required to consult the House Speaker (a Shia Muslim) as well as members of the National Assembly before naming a prime minister (a Sunni Muslim), and the president's power to dismiss ministers was transferred to the cabinet. Aoun rejected these amendments and launched another rebellion in 1990. Syria, however, quickly suppressed his move, thus ending the civil war in October 1990, and set about rebuilding the Lebanese army and imposing political reform.
Nevertheless, the concept of "democracy of consensus" that appeared on the top of the Constitution remained a source of contradiction, mainly in its interpretation. This concept, as well as the whole concept of partnership, continued to be the main source of internal conflicts that emerge from one time to another in the country.
This concept in fact was behind the fierce division that the Lebanese witnessed following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. It was a sharp turn in Lebanon’s political life that gave birth to two main political blocs that differ in everything, even in defining partnership. The mentioned division even put Lebanon, once again, on the verge of abyss when an unconstitutional government, headed by Fouad Saniora, was formed without the representation of Shiite Muslims, symbolizing again the dangerous concept of monopolization in the diversified country.
In conclusion, and while the older generation is disillusioned with war, there is fear that the younger generation is more than willing to take up arms, unaware of the repercussions of such decision. Moreover, the conflicts among Lebanese, on the eve of an electoral battle set to take place on June 7, don't assume an assuring role. The electoral platforms are more than a proof when a political bloc declares publicly that it rejects partnership, despite the fact that all estimations foresee that the upcoming "parliamentary majority" wouldn't exceed the "parliamentary minority" by more than the hand's fingers.
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