Thursday, 28 May 2009

Indyk: “... There is greater flexibility than in the past in Syria, ... not on territory .."

link

In the PULSE: "...this interview from Yediot Achronoth, unconstrained by official responsibility, he actually says what he thinks. This interview will not make him more popular in Israel

" ....Your book, we said, provides one major lesson with regard to US administrations: Your [administrations] are very naïve, make many errors and frequently fail. Why should Netanyahu listen to you “We are not the only ones who have failed,” Indyk said. “You too have erred and failed. We failed, among other reasons, because President Clinton did his best to meet the wishes of your prime ministers. There were other reasons: lack of leadership on Assad’s part, errors made by Arafat and opportunities missed by Israel. There is a lot of failure to go around. The first lesson is humility, humility for everyone. We should be more modest, less naïve, less arrogant.
“Netanyahu should listen to Obama because Obama is telling him, in essence, that resolving the conflict is an American interest. What is happening at present is that the Israeli-Arab conflict serves as an instrument in the hands of America’s enemies—Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas.....
“There is no question that Israel is taking a tangible risk,” he replied. “But all these years, the US has been strengthening you precisely for this purpose—so that you can take the risk of making peace. How exactly can the Palestinians destroy you? The real existential danger is that you will not succeed in parting from them.
Look what happened in Gaza, we said. It is doubtful whether we can afford to have a Hamastan in the West Bank.
“That is a good argument for a debate, but not a recipe for policy,” he said. “You left Gaza unilaterally, without an agreement. No one is talking about a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank.”...


On Syria

“Yes,” he said, “it could have been done differently. The joint strategy, ours and yours, was Syria first. At the Shepherdstownconference of January 2000, when we missed the chance to reach an agreement with the Syrians, Arafat experienced a turnabout. Until then,he was afraid of being left behind. After the failure with the Syrians, Barak and Clinton—as President Bush rightfully said—courted Arafat desperately. Had there been an agreement with Syria, the equation wouldhave been different.

“I write in the book that for seven years, Hafez Assad was interested in the process, not the outcome, but before his death he underwent a change: he wanted to reach a deal. The fact is that over the years, he refused to send a senior figure to direct negotiations with Israel. Prior to his death, he sent his foreign minister Farouk Ashara to the talks.

“When Ashara came to Washington to negotiate with Barak, we dealt with the question why he did not shake his hand and why he condemned Israel in his speech, and ignored the most important thing he said: it is a dispute over borders, not an existential conflict. The Syrians were prepared for a series of compromises. People who read my book say that Barak did not have the courage to complete an agreement with the Syrians. Barak is a courageous man, there is no argument about that. The problem was the timing. The moment to finalize an agreement with Assad was between December 1999 and February 2000. Had Barak risen to the occasion at the right moment, it would have changed everything.”

You were recently in Damascus, we said, as the guest of Foreign Minister Walid Muallem. With what insight did you return from there? “There is greater flexibility than in the past in Syria,” he said. “Not on territory—it would be a mistake to think that they have changed their position. They will not cede a single centimeter of territory.

But if Israel recognizes Syria’s sovereignty over the entire Golan, they will be willing to talk about what remains, including Israeli communities under Syrian sovereignty.” The three windows In the book, we said, you describe how you [i.e., the administration] blatantly intervened in the Israeli elections of 1996 in favor of Peres and against Netanyahu. How did you dare?

“Don’t get so excited,” Indyk said. “We are not alone in this story. Now you can understand what Clinton felt when Netanyahu tried to incite members of Congress against him. Clinton acted the same way as Netanyahu. Why criticize him and not Netanyahu? There is a double standard here. Incidentally, the intervention of both of them only caused damage to their interests. The lesson is: don’t try to intervene...."



Posted by G, Z, & or B at 12:35 PM

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