Getting Ready for Hezbollah; Getting Ready for Israel

Sunday, 16 May 2010

Getting Ready for Hezbollah; Getting Ready for Israel

Al-Manar
Mohamad Shmaysani

16/05/2010 Yedioth Aharonoth’s Alex Fishman wrote that the Israeli Army was to “head into the next Lebanon war with more firepower and upgraded capabilities.”

Fishman expressed concern about the alleged Scud missile transfer from Syria to Hezbollah which constitutes “a threat on Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona.”

According to his analysis, Hezbollah “does not have plans to take over areas in the Galilee. It may have the ability to raid a community, in order to produce drama, yet its war will focus on firing rockets and missiles deep into Israel, over time. For that reason, most of its fortifications aim to protect and feed its strategic arm.”

“This protection is premised on roughly 160 military compounds established in southern Lebanon, in villages and in their vicinity, including in Christian enclaves. For that reason, when the IDF held drills it referred to the communities as military compounds in every way. For a change, the army will head into the next war in Lebanon with a plan that had already been practiced,” Fishman added.

In his article, Fishman sought to portray Hezbollah as a “vulnerable force” especially after “its long-range missiles were destroyed within 35 minutes” during the 2006 war. He suggests that “the Israeli Air Force's and ground forces' abilities in terms of accurate weaponry and hitting such targets have improved since then, by several notches.”

Speaking to Al-Manar, n expert in Israeli affairs Mohammed Yussuf, undermined Fisher’s claims saying “if this was the case then Israel should have hit Hezbollah a long time ago without fear of the Islamic Resistance’s fire power. Fisher is trying to lift the morals of his audience especially when he brushes aside the possession of Hezbollah to advanced weapons because they require maintenance and high technological capabilities. He should remember that the resistance had downed an Israeli helicopter, sank a Saar vessel, melted the pride Israel “The Merkavas” and infiltrated the Israeli army’s telecommunication system during the 2006 war in which they (Israelis) conceded defeat according to the Winograd Report. The author should not delude his audience. Israeli leaders are not deluding their public because they understand that as their army has been building up, Hezbollah has been doing the same.”

Fisher suggests that in the next war, the UN Interim Forces in South Lebanon (UNIFIL) “will not be in south Lebanon. Its members will leave when the war breaks out, even if they're not saying this right now. UNIFIL does not have the mandate to interfere in the fighting, and it certainly has an interest in safeguarding its soldiers' lives. On another front, the 15,000 troops of the Lebanese Army deployed south of the Litani River do not constitute a target for the IDF at this time. However, this army is expected to put up a fight once a war breaks out. Based on this logic, the IDF will be addressing this army as a hostile force. In other words, any clash that includes IDF ground movement in Lebanon will have to push aside and neutralize these 15,000 troops as quickly as possible.”

“Fisher seems to have forgotten that in every Israeli war on Lebanon, Israeli soldiers kill a number of UNIFIL personnel and then, sometimes, apologize for the “mishap.” Fisher also forgot that the Lebanese army, the resistance and the population mainly in south Lebanon will be fighting for their land, on their land, against an aggressor. Israel can destroy, burn, kill and do whatever it wants from the air, but on the ground calculations are different. In 2006, the ground assault was delayed because of those different calculations and when they went in, they were dealt a severe blow. Today the case is not different,” Yussuf told Al-Manar.

Fisher claimed in his article that Hezbollah’s Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah was “apparently unconvinced that his group has reached the optimal point to embark on war. He possesses endless amounts of rockets, yet not many accurate and long-range missiles. We can assume that once he accumulates a sufficient arsenal, the countdown shall begin. The fire will only be a matter of time.”

“Fisher did forget that Sayyed Nasrallah said lately that ‘we do not want war but we long for it,’ and missed that longing for a war means being fully ready for it. I’m not sure where Fisher is getting his information from, but a small look at the general scene reveals a war in the future against Lebanon will turn regional and Israel will be eventually trapped. Israel is not really convinced in war, but before a growing power of the resistance in Lebanon and the region in general, the zionist entity might think of escaping forward, thus initiating the war that according to Zionist leaders like Ben Gurion and others, could be Israel’s last,” Yussuf said.

Israeli 'strategic' thinking: "Hezbollah is all measured & doomed ... "

YNEtnews/ here

The Scud missiles which Hezbollah reportedly received from Syria are meant for a specific objective. Should it indeed turn out that the missiles smuggled in are of the Scud D type, this is apparently a threat on Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona.
As far as is known, Nasrallah's group does not have plans to take over areas in the Galilee. It may have the ability to raid a community, in order to produce drama, yet its war will focus on firing rockets and missiles deep into Israel, over time. For that reason, most of its fortifications aim to protect and feed its strategic arm.
This protection is premised on roughly 160 military compounds established in southern Lebanon, in villages and in their vicinity, including in Christian enclaves. For that reason, when the IDF held drills it referred to the communities as military compounds in every way. For a change, the army will head into the next war in Lebanon with a plan that had already been practiced.

Hezbollah started the process of drawing lessons in the wake of the Second Lebanon War, and updated them following Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. The operation in the south in 2008-9 demonstrated to an even greater extent than in 2006 the grave results of the IDF's so-called "Dahiya Doctrine" – Nasrallah realizes that today the IDF is in a whole new place, both in terms of maneuvering and firepower.
For this reason, Hezbollah (as well as Hamas) is rapidly digging up fortifications underground – bunkers, headquarters, control centers, and passage ways from one sector to another.
In order to direct coordinated fire at the same target, one needs a much more advanced command and control system than the one possessed by Hezbollah thus far. Here, in fact, lies its vulnerability. On the one hand, it's hard to cope with a terror group that conducts itself like an army. On the other hand, Hezbollah is already suffering all the problems of an institutionalized military organization; problems which small and secretive guerilla cells are not afflicted with....
Hezbollah's dream is to maintain an army of at least 40,000 men, Today it has less than half of that, and the increase it aspires for requires compromise on manpower quality. Moreover, advanced weapons systems require strict maintenance and high technological capabilities. This is no longer a case of fighting with your Kalashnikov or RPG.
In the next war, UNIFIL will not be in south Lebanon. Its members will leave when the war breaks out, even if they're not saying this right now. UNIFIL does not have the mandate to interfere in the fighting, and it certainly has an interest in safeguarding its soldiers' lives.
On another front, the 15,000 troops of the Lebanese Army deployed south of the Litani River do not constitute a target for the IDF at this time. However, this army is expected to put up a fight once a war breaks out. Based on this logic, the IDF will be addressing this army as a hostile force. In other words, any clash that includes IDF ground movement in Lebanon will have to push aside and neutralize these 15,000 troops as quickly as possible.
Nasrallah is apparently unconvinced that his group has reached the optimal point to embark on war. He possesses endless amounts of rockets, yet not many accurate and long-range missiles. We can assume that once he accumulates a sufficient arsenal, the countdown shall begin. The fire will only be a matter of time.

And this is precisely the place to ask what Israel's government is doing so that these balance-violating weapons won't continue to pour into Hezbollah's hands, and whether the convoys that cross the Syria-Lebanon border should continue to enjoy impunity under UN Resolution 1701."