It's all about Syria: Hezbollah & the Lebanese Army...

Via Friday-Lunch-Club

Excerpts from Oxford Analytica: (failed to note that both, President Lahoud and; Michel Aoun, still retain a great deal of influence within the Army's officers' corps. Furthermore, the throttling 'Syria-Hezbollah divergence' design to death, suggests ONE contradictory conclusion for its proponents, & only one: bring back the Syrians, a quite pleasing prospect for Hezbollah.)

"... The August 19 round of National Dialogue sessions highlighted the continuing controversy over Hizbollah's weapons and the attempt to form a National Defence Strategy. It also demonstrated the increasing prominence of the Lebanese Army as a subject of domestic debate, especially after the passive role it took during the domestic clashes of May 2008 and fighting last month between members of Hizbollah and of a Sunni group, Al-Ahbash...

Competition. The Lebanese Army is the object of increasingly intense competition. For the Western-oriented March 14 coalition, it represents a possible competitor to Hizbollah in the south, and a potential protection against domestic instability. Yet the military defeat of March 14 in the May 2008 clashes with Hizbollah has lost this coalition -- and Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri -- some of its influence on the army. Hizbollah competes for influence in order to prevent the army from becoming a rival in the south or a tool to curb its activities. At present, Hizbollah has more success:

It uses its ability to appoint high-ranking military officials, and interacts daily with the army in the south. The army has turned a blind eye to weapons smuggling and allowed Hizbollah fighters free movement. Hizbollah uses its influence to deter the army from involvement in domestic clashes and to limit its role (and interference) in the south.

Financing. Clashes last month between the army and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) highlighted the regional dimension of this competition:

The Lebanese Army's initiation of the clashes raised some doubt over its position regarding the situation on the southern border.

This prompted some US Congress members to call for an end to US funding to the army, increasingly seen as dominated by Hizbollah.

Suleiman responded by calling for local funding of the army, and Nasrallah followed this with his call for Iranian financing....

The Lebanese Army was heavily criticised for its non-intervention, acting purely as an intermediary in meetings between the two parties. Only once the fighters withdrew from the streets were soldiers deployed. The government (which, while including Hizbollah officials, is represented by March 14's Hariri), has called for a tough security response to the clashes. However, the army's action now and in the event of future clashes will depend on the extent of government control over the army.

Structural constraints. As an institution, the Lebanese Army faces two constraints that will affect its response to the current competition:

The army's sectarian composition has so far prevented it from taking sides. It has remained passive when faced with inter-sectarian clashes, refusing to intervene in case of possible fragmentation. Moreover, it is still heavily dependent on Syria's will, and its response will depend on the Syrian strategy regarding Lebanon.

Syria. During the last couple of years, Syria has sought to limit any shift of the army toward March 14 or the United States. Its role in Lebanon is once again increasing, alongside an improvement of Saudi-Syrian relations; the two states have agreed to commit to the stability of the country, with the Lebanese Army playing a more proactive role.

Moreover, there have been some signs recently that Syria and Hizbollah might begin to diverge in their strategies for Lebanon: The Saudi-Syrian agreement, bringing a greater role to the army, may agitate Hizbollah.

The possible indictment of Hizbollah members (and not Syrian officials) in the investigations of the UN Tribunal into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri could be a cause of disruption in relations.. Hizbollah's Beirut clashes with Al-Ahbash may in fact have reflected broader growing tension between the two groups; the latter is a close ally of Syria.

Differing rhetoric and impressions of divergence may disguise an enduring underlying agreement, and it is too soon to assume an inevitable distancing in relations. However, should such a divergence take place, it would have considerable implications. The army would be an asset in the hands of Syria to limit Hizbollah's influence. A growth in the army's role at the expense of Hizbollah could lead to clashes between the two. Nevertheless, such a scenario remains dependent on whether the Saudi-Syrian agreement will persist....

The army's sectarian composition impedes any clear alignment with either contending side. However, it could play a greater role in the political situation through less overt activities such as intelligence gathering and peace-keeping. Yet its ability to take such a role will depend both on the outworkings of the competition, and significantly, on Syria's strategy.

The army's clashes with the IDF seem to have been one-off. It is not ready to engage in war with Israel, lacking the capacity and the political will. Thus, absent a shift in Damascus's position, the role of the army in the south is likely to remain unchanged, involving close collaboration with Hizbollah and UNIFIL. However, in the event of a Syrian policy change, the army could be expected to play a more active role in the south, possibly curbing some of Hizbollah's activities...."

Posted by G, Z, or B at 9:09 AM

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