"... I'm not feeling too optimistic that what they are delineating, based on year's of hard learned experience, will actually be done. In fact I'm pretty sure we will see something of the usual suspects version of the use of force: a no fly zone that doesn't do much to remove Qathafi (which is now, if I understood the President's remarks correctly, the overall stated US objective: that he has to go), followed by pressure from both our allies (France, Britain) and from the internal foreign and defense policy mavens that we must do more, America is looking weak, we're not living up to our standards - the usual arguments for boots on the ground intervention, which will result in said intervention. Then we will start hearing the arguments that we have to expand operations so as not to discredit those who have already risked so much and because we can not allow Libya to descend into an ungoverned state of chaos, destabilize the region, and become a haven for al Qaeda, other extremists, and/or international criminals. This will then become the basis for the need for the US to build a modern Libyan nation-state. Since only time will tell how what we do plays out, let me move on to a brief discussion regarding whether we should or should not intervene.
I think there is a good argument for not getting involved. It is focused around the question that we really do not know who we are dealing with in terms of the anti-Qathafi elements. We do not know how unified they are, whether they would be an improvement over the Qathafi as the "Devil we know...", or whether they are even capable (as in thought through, have a plan, have the means to carry out that plan) of governing Libya should Qathafi leave power....."
No comments:
Post a Comment