Via FLC
Part II of this, in Al Akhbar/ English Edition;
"... So Qatar launched Al Jazeera in order to break through the media monopoly of the House of Saud (which was imposed after 1990 when Khalid Bin Sultan toured world capitals to buy all Arab media). Iraqi and Libyan money produced rival media outlets but funding ended by the early 1990s.Qatar also supported other media outlets (New TV and Al-Quds Al-`Arabi) in order to promote views that are opposed to Saudi Arabia.
When Al Jazeera was first launched it had wide parameters of expression: and it was quite hospitable to views that are opposed to Saudi Arabia. It hosted Sa`d Faqih and Muhammad Al-Mas`ari who critiqued the royal family (the former is a constant irritant for the House of Saud).Al Jazeera focused on the Saudi matters and even went after regional allies of Saudi Arabia. To be fair, allies of Qatar were not spared either: the climate was rather free at first. But the recent rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Qatar was the product of a marriage of convenience. Qatar would no longer use Al Jazeera against Saudi Arabia (the Emir of Qatar told me that King Abdullah used to complain about my appearances on Al Jazeera), while Saudi Arabia would end its marginalization of Qatar in the region. The nature of the deal that has been building between the two countries is still a mystery but the GCC meeting that blessed the Saudi invasion of Bahrain was crucial.GCC countries were bent on fighting democratic change. All agreed that they would stand united against any protest movement that would target any member state.
Qatar shifted its policies markedly from that point onwards and its coverage of the Arab world shifted as well.Qatar not only became a dominant force within the Arab League, but it also became dominant in the GCC. Its chief regional nemesis, Husni Mubarak, was overthrown, and another regional enemy, Jordan’s King Abdullah, was busy protecting his increasingly precarious throne. Furthermore, there is a huge vacuum in Arab leadership due to the succession crisis in Saudi Arabia and the aging of key Saudi princes.
Qatar quickly filled the void and its policies became consistent with US policies, which prevented Saudi Arabia from opposing them. And Qatar almost suddenly abandoned its previous allies: Syria, Hezbollah and Iran.
Qatar became the regional enforcer on behalf of the US. It was a key actor in Libya providing NATO with token Arab cover, and it has undoubtedly served as a mediator between the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood (and their clones) and the US.
And all of a sudden, Qatar’s most reliable cleric, tele-Islamist Yusuf al-Qaradawi, made the overthrow of the Syrian regime the most urgent matter from an Islamic point of view. (Qaradawi had in the past praised Bashar Assad but he never wavered in his loyalty to Gulf oil and gas).But the full story of the rift between Syria and Qatar has not been told: it is not clear how and why Qatar decided to break with Bashar, who has been a close ally of Qatar. It is possible that this was part of the secret Qatari-Saudi deal. It is possible that Qatar is answering to the US now (US-Qatari relations suffered a serious crisis during the Bush years. The Emir of Qatar told me that George Tenet delivered a tough message from the US president regarding Al Jazeera’s coverage and it implied a threat. And Dick Cheney abruptly ended a meeting with the Emir when the latter refused to discuss Al Jazeera’s coverage with him). But Qatar may be overplaying its hand. Its role far exceeds its size and its capabilities. To pose as a (selective) champion of democracy while preserving dynastic rule will pose a challenge sometime in the future. There are many rivals to Qatar, and Arab governments may feel increasingly uncomfortable in serving as US clients. Finally, the notion that the tide of the uprisings can’t hit the Gulf region has been disproven in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain...."
Ghannushi offers the t-shirt of his party to Qaradaw
Uprooted Palestinian
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