US Military Research: This Is How Hizbullah Defeated "Israel" in 2006 War"

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Under the title "All Glory Is Fleeting, Insights from the Second Lebanon War", the researcher Russell W. Glenn stressed that the "Israeli" response to Hizbullah's 2006 military captive of two "Israeli" soldiers was both "quick and violent."

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Joint Forces Command Joint Urban Operations Office. The research was conducted in the RAND National "Defense" Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of War, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the military agencies, and the war Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.

In a clear reflection to Hizbullah's victory in July 2006 war over the "Israeli" army, the research shed light on the following facts: "The event left the "Israeli" a chastened force and "Israel" an introspective "nation". An independent commission charged with reviewing that military's performance soundly criticized the "Israeli" prime minister, "defense" minister, and "IDF" chief of staff."

"The latter two lost their positions," the paper said.

The analysis draws on information provided by serving "Israeli" personnel during a March 2007 conference held in Tel Aviv, interviews with active-duty and retired "Israeli" officers, and written sources.

"A strategy of relying on air power alone was universally condemned as wrong-headed," the paper explained and noted that "campaign plans for operations in southern Lebanon were found to be outdated."

It further mentioned that " the "Israeli" doctrine and the theoretical concepts on which it rested were thought to have been infiltrated by an intellectual virus, the consequences of which were guidance that was so obtuse as to be largely incomprehensible."

"Lack of training and the failure to prepare for anything other than intifada tasks also led to some officers' unrealistic expectations about the quality of intelligence they would receive regarding the enemy and terrain," Glenn stated.

The researcher stressed that ""Israel" seems to have been unprepared to deal with the level of sophistication developed by its erstwhile enemy as a military force, perhaps assuming that little had changed in the six years since the "IDF" left Lebanon."

"Those ["Israeli"] leaders too often did not move forward to inspire and determine battlefield conditions, the result of which was, in part, conflicts among orders, which frustrated soldiers and exposed them to unnecessary risk," he added.

Moreover, the paper mentioned that the ""Israelis", once masters of the operational art, seem to have miscomprehended the very nature of the conflict at hand."

"Military and political leaders did not correctly draw on their national assets in the service of strategic objectives, nor did those in top "IDF" positions confront their civilian overseers with the hard facts and difficult decisions that were essential to prevailing. Shortfalls were many; the failures were, at times, system wide," Glenn clarified.

On Hizbullah readiness, the researcher found that the "Israeli" unpreparedness "is in stark contrast to the care with which Hizbullah trained and prepared its dfenses in readiness forn attack by "Israel"."

 

 ""Israel" recognized that far too many of its difficulties during the Second Lebanon War were failures of leadership. The actions and judgments of the prime minister, "defense" minister, and many commanders at echelons from IDF chief of staff to those below brigade demonstrated, in one way or another, that more attention to educating leaders and their staffs is necessary," the writer stated.

In parallel, he highlighted the "Israeli" tactical failures: "It was reported that tactical-level commanders in too many cases never left their command posts to cross into southern Lebanon and gauge conditions at the front."

There were operational-level shortfalls: Fears of soldier casualties first stopped attacks and later slowed them to the pace of bulldozers constructing new roads. There were strategic misjudgments: Expectations regarding what could realistically be expected of air power were naïve," the analysis concluded.

Source: Rand, Edited by moqawama.org

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