ICG: "One should not ignore the views of many Syrians who continue to fear the regime's collapse..."

IVia FLC

"... Although one cannot exclude possible foreign involvement in the ongoing crisis, credible evidence points to abundant instances of excessive and indiscriminate state violence, including arbitrary arrests, torture and firing into peaceful crowds. At its core, this is a spontaneous, peaceful, popular uprising, fuelled far more by the regime’s own actions than by any putative outside interference. There are plausible reports of security forces being ambushed by unidentified armed groups, as well as of protesters firing back when attacked. But for those on the ground, there can be no doubt that the vast majority of casualties are the result of regime brutality...

At this point, moreover, questions are being raised both about the authorities’ ability to control and discipline the security apparatus and about the security forces’ willingness to convey to their political leadership a truthful picture of what is happening on the ground. To date, the leadership has evinced no readiness to impose clarity of mission, discipline or accountability on its security apparatus; there is, for example, not a single known instance of meaningful sanctions to punish unlawful or excessive use of force.

The regime’s violent, unlawful and disorderly response has only further deepened a pervasive sense of chaos. In turn, this has discredited the reforms it announced in hopes of defusing the situation and shoring up its political base. However meaningful or promising they might have been on paper, they have proven worthless in practice... and although it has engaged in numerous bilateral talks with local representatives, it resists convening a national dialogue, which might represent the last, slim chance for a peaceful way forward...

Even if massive repression were to succeed in the short term, any such victory would at best be pyrrhic.  In the wake of the crackdown, the security services would rule supreme. President Assad’s domestic and international credibility would be shattered. Few countries would be willing to lend a hand to redress a devastated economy. Major investments, development projects and cultural ventures would find few foreign partners. Assad might well prevent forcible regime change, but the regime will have been fundamentally transformed all the same.

The only -- decreasingly realistic– chance to avoid this outcome would be for the regime to take immediate steps to rein in its security forces, take decisive action against those responsible for state violence and initiate a genuine, all-inclusive national dialogue. A halt to the cycle of violence could create the space necessary for representatives of the popular movement to articulate their demands and for negotiations on a real, far-reaching program of reforms to proceed. Most importantly, it would give the regime the opportunity to demonstrate it has more to offer than empty words and certain doom.

For the international community, the Syrian crisis poses a vexing challenge... Outside actors possess little leverage, particularly at a time when the regime feels its survival is at stake. It has survived past periods of international isolation and likely feels it can weather the storm again. Even countries that have developed close ties to Damascus, such as Turkey, are viewed with growing suspicion... Neighbouring states have an enormous stake in averting enduring instability. Chaos in an ethnically and confessionally heterogeneous Syria would have swift and potentially devastating impact on Turkey – a country with which it shares an 877 kilometre long and porous border; Lebanon, whose fate historically has been tied to its neighbour’s; Jordan, a small state likewise at the mercy of Syrian developments; and Iraq, which is barely recovering from its civil war and can hardly afford sectarian fighting at its borders. As a result, they should strive to prevent any cross-border trafficking involving militants, weapons or money...

In fashioning a proper international response, two more factors should be borne in mind.

First, although overall trends are increasingly clear, many specific allegations regarding developments in Syria (concerning for example possible dissent within the security forces; the scale of protests; the identity of those who have killed security officers) remain hard to verify. Because the regime has denied the international media access, many in the media have been forced to rely on uncorroborated material posted on the internet as well as on unvetted witness testimony. There is a risk in reacting immediately to such raw and inevitably partial accounts. It will be important for outside actors to base their actions on as thorough and level-headed as possible assessments of events on the ground.

Second, one should not ignore the views of many Syrians – even among those without sympathy for the regime – who continue to fear its precipitous collapse . They dread the breakup of a state whose institutions, including the military, are weak even by regional standards. They fear that sectarian dynamics or a hegemonic religious agenda could take hold. They are suspicious of possible foreign interference. And they distrust an exiled opposition that is all too reminiscent of Iraq’s. Short of the regime’s implosion, they seem persuaded that only an indigenous, negotiated solution can offer hope for a successful political transition.."

Posted by G, M, Z, or B at 9:56 AM

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