Hijazi: “Israeli” Community to Accept Being Terribly Defeated

Mariam Ali"Israel" and Lebanon might fight on ever thing in this world but not on one thing: "Five years ago, "Israel" was defeated." "Israeli" former head of the so- called National Security Council General (Ret.) Giora Eiland clearly regards July 2006 an "Israeli" failure. The man who supports Winograd report stresses that "the war reflects a profound weakness in the "Israeli" army." "There was incoherence among goals, assignments, and methods at every level. Battalions made it into and out of Lebanon without clear purpose or direction," Eiland clarifies. "Israeli's" Failing Objectives The Political Analyst in "Israeli Affairs" "Mr. Hassan Hijazi explains to "moqawama" website the facts related to the "Israeli" defeat in 2006. "It is well known that July 2006 war is considered one of the major steps through which "Israel" tried to get rid of what it considers a great threat on its Northern borders -the resistance- with what it owns from military capabilities forming a deterrent to its greed and aggression against Lebanon," Hijazi said. The analyst stated that "the first prior consideration and the clear objectives of the war, announced by military or political officials, concentrated at the beginning of the war on eliminating the military capability and the application of UN resolutions 1559 which calls do disarm Hizbullah from its weapons." He added that "there were goals far beyond this resembled by changing the political map inside Lebanon through betting on some internal voices that rise after the assassination of former Prime Minister in 2005 that they would be able to control and lead the country into a political settlement between Lebanon and "Israel"." The "Israelis" started with a high ceiling objectives resembled by heavily striking and eliminating Hizbullah. As the "Israeli" air forces completed its list of targets within 5 days and when the bank of targeted positions ended, the resistance missiles on the "Israeli" settlements continued being launched. "The Secretary General of Hizbullah His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah advised the "Israeli" military leadership to ask their experts and not to venture. However, Olmert's government accompanied by Halutz underestimated the facts and went into high objectives," Hijazi told our website. Defeat in Field "The resistance men proved their huge abilities in the field combat just one meter far from occupied Palestine. The "Israelis" started acknowledging that there is a reality that extends the Zionist capability to resolve the battle," Hijazi viewed. Moving in his analysis, the "Israeli Affairs" Specialist adds that "from this point the "Israelis" started to be modest in their goals. After having the goal to eliminate Hizbullah, the "Israeli" wanted to exile Hizbullah away 20 km of the borders or to form a buffer zone away 15 or 10 km from the borders and the list of decreasing the aims continues till the Zionist enemy agreed in the final moments of war on 1701 not under the 7th item of UN resolutions." "The "Israeli" was obliged to agree on UNIFL that has no powers on the ground, which is similar to the situation prior to launching war," he assured. As soon as the guns fell silent, "Israeli" officials began to take stock of their new situation. There was unease and a great shock. Politicians and military officials squabbled over responsibility. "The "Israeli" defeat was in the first level at the political level that is the war didn't achieve any of its goals. Hizbullah remained as it is and it owned a military capability that is estimated by the "Israeli" to be greater to three or four times than that it had in 2006," Hijazi said trying to summarize some aspects of July 2006 victory. "The image of the "Israeli" army was so much shaken through the confrontations that the Mujahedeen went through with the so-called greatest army in the region. The military side received a number of strikes that hit the major joints of the "Israeli" army from the Navy to dropping helicopters passing through the Mirkava massacres or the face to face fight between the resistance men in the Southern board villages and the elite units of the enemy's army." Haaretz" "Israeli" daily confirms Hijazi's statement's by quoting one of the elite humiliated soldiers "Fighters of the Golani Battalion 51, who stood firm in the battle that became one of the symbols of Lebanon's second war, are still struggling to live normally. There are soldiers who are unable to sleep the whole night since then. It was a stupid decision to enter Bint Jbeil." The enemy's army inability to act especially that it has the first military technology in the region provided a very negative image. Winograd has stated that the "a group of few men succeeded in resisting the well equipped "Israeli" army. "This is the political defeat. The July 2006 war provided nothing to decision takers in Tel Aviv but humiliation and disappointment," Hijazi comments. Aspects of Psychological War Failure Concerning the psychological war, Hijazi branches it into two chapters that both fall under the title "the resistance victory of the psychological war." "The Secretary General of Hizbullah's appearance and statements during the war's day were of great effect so that the "Israeli" community waited Sayyed Nasrallah's statement. They waited for neither Peretz nor Halotz or Olmert. His eminence statements on the coming surprises, what is beyond Haifa, the inability and folly of the "Israeli" Leadership and so on had a big influence on the "Israeli settlers" spirits. This formed a way for resistance to have an access to the Zionist community and affect it. However, the resistance community was so strong and got more attached to Hizbullah as the war days passed," Hijazi told our website. Further underlying "Israel's" lack of preparation to the psychological war parallel to military one, "the strikes against "Israeli" army and its appearance through resistance media outlets like "al-Manar", "an-Nour", and "al-Intiqad" greatly affected in a negative manner the Zionist community while at the same time it had a positive influence on the Lebanese community. This was a very important side in confirming the "Israeli" defeat in both the battle and psychological war." Polls inside the Zionst community revealed the extent of Hizbullah's advancement in the psychological war according to comparison between the "Israeli" and Resistance Leadership. As July war is one of circles in a long conflict that resistance passed through, the "Israelis" came to the war in an attempt to erase 2000 defeat from the memory of the "Israeli" community. However, these were some of the surprises. "The "Israelis" waged the war keeping in mind the previous defeat. However, July 2006 war uncovered the truth that the army lacks the ability in a wide range war in spite of using all kinds of military tactics and attacks," the specialist added noting "that this entity that considers itself superior in the domain of military accompanied by international support was no more able to achieve victories and that it has to be prepared to coming wars that are to be more aggressive than the previous ones." "Israel" to be Familiar with Defeat Responding to a question on the possibility of the next war, Hijazi acknowledges "five years passed and the "Israeli" leadership talks a lot about waging a war but in reality the political and military leadership lacks the courage to do so. The way that Olmert's political life ended forms a lesson to any leader in the Zionist community to think more than one time before waging a war against Lebanon. This forms a kind of complex in the "Israeli" leadership for any war against Lebanon or Hizbullah has no secure consequences and might turn into toppling any "Israeli" official. July war formed a barrier to any authority to take any failing war adventure. Admitting that the "Israeli" military has been working in the past five years to well equip the army, train it, and to provide all possible abilities to prepare for the coming confrontation, he points out that "the lesson that is too much reiterated is that the army must prepare for the next war and not the previous war i.e. not to put the past 2006 Hizbullah in the military equation because Hizbullah had more advanced abilities, more military capabilities and more tactics as well as weapons than 2006." "The "Israeli" military leadership understood the lesson. The former "Israeli" chief of Staff Ghabi Ashkinazi tries hard to reduce the political rush towards another war or taking another adventure. The permanent" chief of Staff Beni Gantz has a similar view to his predecessor and is not ready to take another adventure or a war against Iran or launching another war. The military officials form an obstacle to political investment of another war since the army is much more aware of consequences on the ground," Hijazi concluded advising the "Israeli" community to become familiar with the idea of being terribly defeated."

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