"... We need to drive a wedge between Assad on one hand, & the Army and the Alawites on the other!"

FLC

U.S. Priorities in a Changing Middle East
Interviewee:
Robert Danin, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewer:
Deborah Jerome, Deputy Editor, CFR.org, Council on Foreign Relations

July 27, 2011
...We must keep our focus on Egypt, first and foremost. As home to a quarter of the Arab peoples and perhaps the key galvanizer within the region, Egypt will be the critical trendsetter. A smooth and peaceful transition to a more representative government, with checks and balances, could have a positive demonstration effect. Similarly, a descent into greater sectarian conflict, a failed transition to effective civil governance, and no real improvement could precipitate more unrest and ultimately violence. The Obama administration understands that Egypt is central and is focused on that.
Obviously, Libya is now critical because we and the international community are engaged there militarily. We have drawn a line in the sand, and we now have lives and credibility at stake. This will have a regional demonstration effect of one sort or another. I would point to three other places critical for the United States: First is Saudi Arabia, given the West's energy dependency and Saudi Arabia's centrality to Gulf security. Second is Syria, the only Arab state fully aligned with Iran, which has become a widespread killing field for the regime against its own people. Third is Yemen, a potentially failed state that risks becoming a sanctuary for terrorists and anti-Western radicals.
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How has the U.S. intervention in Libya driven policy options in Syria?
The United States has been slow to react to developments in Syria and slow to condemn the regime's brutality. It is probably the case that NATO's military involvement in Libya detracts from our ability to focus on Syria. We do not have an obvious military option in Syria, nor should we explore one. But there needs to be greater attention focused on Syria, and greater international community mobilization around a common position, much as we have done via the Libya Contact Group. We also need improved outreach to key parties in the region about Syria, particularly its neighbors—Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, which, while not a neighbor, can play a critical role.
The fundamental problem in Syria now is that the longer the unrest continues, the greater the risk that the Assad regime will manipulate it and exacerbate the divisions that exist within a diverse population consisting of Alawites, Christians, Sunnis, and Kurds. Our goal now must be twofold: To drive a wedge between Assad and the Alawite community, to prevent the conflict from becoming sectarian. And to find carrots and sticks to encourage the Sunni merchant classes in Damascus and Aleppo, places that have remained quiet so far, to break from the regime. This could allow for a rapid transition from power. My fear is the longer this drags on, the more difficult the situation will become, and the greater the chances for real civil war.
Let's say the United States gets what it wishes for in Libya, and Qaddafi steps aside. What would be the aftermath of that in Libya? What about a similar scenario in Syria?
Libya has become important, disproportionately so, because of the region's call for an international response and because of our subsequent efforts to dislodge Qaddafi. The international community met the challenge by authorizing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, which precipitated the first real humanitarian intervention in the Arab world. This sent an important message of concern. But the subsequent mission creep has led to a call for and effort to bring about regime change. We, in the form of NATO, are now fully engaged in Libya. As a result, we've committed ourselves to helping to sort out a broken state after Qaddafi is gone. Given that the country has no effective institutions by Qaddafi's designs, and the strong tribal makeup of the country, salvaging a post-Qaddafi Libya is going to be a major challenge. We, in the form of NATO, are now fully engaged in Libya. As a result, we've committed ourselves to helping to sort out a broken state after Qaddafi is gone.
Syria's socio-economic makeup is fundamentally different. It has a middle class, an educated elite. It has a conscript army that could play an effective role if it manages to disassociate itself from the Assad regime. So the challenges of nation-building that I fear face us in Libya are much less so when it comes to Syria. Yet both places face the risk of real civil war..."

River to Sea Uprooted Palestinian