"I agree!"
"...The new draft also says the president should be over 40 and a Muslim, a prime flaw that independents in the Constitutional Committee were unable to correct.
Christians and secular Muslims raised red flags, but did not say they would boycott the referendum.
Thousands of people gathered in a main square in the capital to show their support to President Bashar Al-Assad, many carrying Syrian flags and pictures of the incumbent leader.
"I came here to say 'yes' to the reforms President Assad is leading," said Ammar, a 29-year-old engineer. "I think the draft constitution is unique, modern and an example that the countries of the Middle East should follow."
"Today is national celebration. Everyone should see what President Assad is doing. He is the only one among Arab leaders who cares of his people," said Samira, as her friends around her shouted slogans to show their loyalty to the President who is facing an unprecedented challenge to his rule. ..."
 | Huge Crowds in Saba Bahrat Square to Support Reforms and Constitutional Referendum DAMASCUS, (SANA)- Huge crowds of citizens on Sunday streamed into Saba Bahrat Square in Damascus in expression of support to the comprehensive reform process and the referendum on the new constitution for the Syrian Arab Republic...Read more |
The Security Solution vs The "Friends of Syria": "Recipe for Deadlock"
By: Nicolas Nassif
There is a complete disconnect between the Friends of Syria conference that was held Friday February 24 in Tunisia and the military solution adopted by the Syrian regime inside Syria.
The dialogue between Syrian President Bashar Assad and his Arab and Western adversaries regarding the bloody crisis in Syria is almost non-existent.
Assad has ignored the pressure and harsh sanctions against his regime and has insisted on pursuing a security solution against the armed opposition in an attempt to create a new balance of power that would guarantee his place at the head of negotiations over the fate of his country under the purview of his regime.
Arab and Western leaders who are against Assad have cut off all direct dialogue with him. Communication is restricted to the media and the strict measures and sanctions taken against his regime.
These leaders rely on two Syrian opposition movements that don’t speak to one another except to highlight their differences, disagreements, and opposing views on foreign military intervention.
Arabs and Western powers distinguish between the first of these groups, the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the rest of the Syrian opposition. They invite the former to the Tunisia conference and the others to dismantle the regime.
As such, the military and political options appear to be moving on parallel tracks that don’t meet anywhere. And there has not been a breakthrough toward a settlement.
The Friends of Syria conference is another diplomatic step for Arab and Western countries after the vote at the UN General Assembly calling on Assad to step down and the many attempts by the UN Security Council to pass a resolution against the Syrian regime.
Developments inside Syria however revolve around the security front after Assad realized that Russian support which includes political backing, arms shipments, intelligence information, and the role of experts has come to represent the main protection – perhaps the only one – for the regime against foreign military intervention.
As such, the recommendations by the Friends of Syria conference are inconsequential inside Syria but can be politically invested outside the country.
Recommendations by the Friends of Syria conference are inconsequential inside Syria.
The three recommendations of the conference are opening humanitarian corridors, recognizing the SNC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and forming an Arab military force to end the violence and manage the transitional period.
Each one of these recommendations is highly desired by both the non-violent and military opposition. But they can be translated on the ground only with the consent of the regime or over its “dead body.” The first option, consent of the regime, is a near impossibility.
While the Friends of Syria conference impact will be felt everywhere in the world except Syria, the referendum on the new constitution called for by Assad on Sunday will be meaningless except in Syria.
These opposing alignments that characterize the Syrian situation have led to further deterioration inside the country in a manner similar to what happened in the first year of the Lebanese war in 1975.
When the international and Arab solutions to the Lebanese crisis failed, the crisis was left to the warring parties – Lebanese and Palestinian – until a settlement fully matured in the second half of 1976.
Who in Lebanon could forget the countless mediation efforts by France, the US, the Vatican, and Arab delegates?
Ultimately, they all agreed to put the military and the political solution in the hands of Syria, whose army was given permission to deploy in Lebanon in order to impose a settlement on everyone.
Later on, this solution was given an Arab cover that hid Western support within its folds.
And the Lebanese tried the same formula again in the Taif agreement in 1989.
Syria today is living through a similar situation. Arab and international solutions have failed while Assad has not been able to reap the benefits of the security solution yet or to convince the opposition to accept reforms in his shadow.
On the other hand, the non-violent and the armed opposition have not been able to topple Assad militarily or destroy his regime by dismantling his army, intelligence apparatuses, and administration. They have only succeeded in turning the protests into bloody confrontations with the army.
Both sides are insistent on a final, decisive resolution but are unable to deliver one.
Like much of what was discussed during the Lebanese war, the Syrian regime wants a settlement that revolves around constitutional and political reforms. The opposition operating outside Syria however has refused to agree to this solution before Assad steps down.
The problem is that both sides are insistent on a final, decisive resolution but are unable to deliver one. Assad, with his army and intelligence services "has not been able to destroy the opposition" much like the SNC, with its solicitation of Western military intervention, has not been able to overthrow Assad by force.
In this tug of war, the Tunisia conference appears to lack the elements of power it professed and it needed.
1- The Tunisia conference did not strip the Syrian president and his regime of international legitimacy given that the aim is to provide humanitarian aid and not engage in major decisions that shift the internal balance of power and turn participating countries into a direct party to the conflict.
The conference included the SNC in the gathering. The SNC is granted partial legitimacy so it can be part of the settlement in the future and not be the one dictating it.
2- Without the risk of establishing a buffer zone on the Turkish, Lebanese, or Jordanian borders with Syria, arming the opposition – which is already armed – becomes essentially impossible. The means of delivering weapons without such a zone to hotly contested areas will be fraught with danger. Hama and Homs are located in the middle of Syria and south of Idlib in northern Syria, is an area besieged by the Syrian army which, in the heat of military confrontations, did not hesitate to reach the Turkish border to oust its foes.
This explains the presence of the Free Syrian Army’s (FSA) leadership inside Turkish territories while its rank and file hide among militias present in areas that fall under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist movements, specifically in central Syria around Hama and Homs and up to the northwest in Idlib.
It also explains the FSA’s failure to exercise effective control over areas in the north, the center, or the south of the country such as Daraa. Also, this explains the FSA’s failure to maintain control over the Damascus Countryside after it almost captured two key entrances to the capital Damascus, namely, the airport and the eastern border with Lebanon.
The truth is, the armed opposition such as the defecting army, does not need light arms which it already has plenty of, smuggled from Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. It needs heavy weapons such as those used by the regular army that enable it to easily control the areas it attacks.
Ultimately then, the Syrian opposition needs an area of its own to turn into a political as well as a military base against the Assad regime and the Baath Party. This way the SNC would not have to be a guest in Paris, London, Riyadh, Doha, or Cairo as is the case today.
Nicolas Nassif is a political analyst at Al-Akhbar.
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