Oxford Analytica: Excerpts:
".... Egypt. The Supreme Military Council is committed to overseeing an Egyptian transition to a more representative and democratic system without yet having a clear idea of how it might look. Constitutional amendments will be put to referendum shortly; these should lead to fairer elections and reduce the powers of the presidency while increasing the influence of parliament -- with implications for various political forces: The former ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), has lost its leading figures but retains its organisation. The businessmen, journalists and others associated with the NDP have jumped on the revolutionary bandwagon and will strive to retain some of their privileges. The other political parties..... none have significant support but two have been given cabinet posts. The groups that brought down Mubarak are disparate, not well organised and potentially competitive. Time is needed ..... The MB has played its hand very well, understanding the deep suspicions of the generals about its intentions. It will play a long game in the belief that later, if not sooner, it will exert a major influence through its effective organisation. It will not compete for the presidency, but may support one of the candidates ...and Amr Moussa .... There is potential for further instability and tensions between the methodical approach of military and the young revolutionaries as well as the wider public, whose expectations of a rapid improvement in their living standards outstrip the ability of the economy to provide the jobs and investment needed.
Bahrain: The initial mishandling of the protest by security forces increased the numbers on the streets..... Many of the less privileged members of the Sunni minority have mobilised behind reform and even the ousting of the monarchy. This has persuaded the regime to offer dialogue with the opposition, with a strong indication that it is prepared to make concessions... Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa al-Khalifa has been in power for nearly 40 years and his relations with the king have been strained, reflecting differences of approach within the ruling family. Protesters have been demanding his removal, and the king may be tempted to try to rid himself of a powerful nuisance and divert calls for his own departure....
Libya. Eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) has long been a centre of opposition to the Muammar al-Qadhafi regime: it was the cornerstone of the monarchy ...... Qadhafi will go down fighting and may be able to delay his demise for a time. When he falls, there could be a period of instability before a new regime emerges, since Qadhafi has marginalised many tribes and allowed no civil society or opposition. A prolonged battle to remove him will increase the risk of violence in the aftermath. A quick departure will allow for a smoother transition. The best hope for Libya is that the newly emerged business elite and the people running government departments, oil companies and state enterprises (and former Qadhafi loyalists now abandoning him) can get together to form the nucleus of a new system -- as begun with the announcement of an interim National Council this week -- and keep the oil and gas flowing....
Yemen. The opposition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) used the 'Egypt effect' to mobilise street protest .... causing cracks in his support base..... The regime's problems will give greater momentum to the southern secessionist movement and may provoke another round of fighting by Shia revivalists in Sa'dah. It will also give encouragement to Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has demonstrated in the last two years the ambition and capacity to launch attacks from Yemen on Western targets. Yemen is in for a chaotic three months at a time when international and regional allies expect it both to do more to fight AQAP and accelerate its reform process; Saleh can survive if he acts with skill and tact, and reforms quickly -- but his success is not guaranteed.........
Algeria. There is little appetite in Algeria for confrontation, given memories of the violence of the 1990s. The army is highly influential, and more enmeshed than its Egyptian counterpart in a network of relationships within the political, bureaucratic and business elite. It may decide to distance itself from the president or ditch a prime minister for tactical reasons but will remain the nucleus of the regime. Yet for the moment, President Abdulaziz Bouteflika is unlikely to become the main focus of discontent, as he is not the symbol of the system like some of his now-deposed neighbours. The regime has the money to finance concessions but will then draw a line and will be ruthless in dealing with any who cross it.
Jordan. King Abdallah has been shaken by the unprecedented level of criticism (much directed against his wife) from hitherto loyal tribal supporters and the previously acquiescent educated classes. He is working hard to retain the loyalty of the army and has signalled greater powers to parliament, reduce the gerrymandering that has favoured small clans over larger tribes and virtually disenfranchised the populous cities, where the Jordanians of Palestinian origin are concentrated... There has been in recent month greater inter-communal and social tensions within Jordan, which may complicate the problem. Jordan will need to become more of a constitutional monarchy or risk following in the path of Egypt and Tunisia ...
Morocco. Rabat is likely to follow a similar route to Amman. There have been large demonstrations but they do not target the king who portrays himself as above politics, and only interested in the welfare of his people. The credibility of this image will now depend on his government taking visible action to address Morocco's problems.
Syria. Syria is the most stable of the republics, albeit for the 'wrong' reasons. The core of the regime is the Allawi community in alliance with other minorities and parts of the majority Sunni community. It is a secular regime and few Syrians want to challenge a system whose collapse could lead to Lebanese-style inter-communal strife. The army and security services, dominated by Allawi, are loyal and will fight to retain power and crack down on major unrest. The regime for years has postponed decisions about making essential economic and social reform but it will now have to change its approach as revolution sweeps through its neighbourhood.
Iraq. Demonstrations in Iraq have grown in size and spread, but mostly focus on lack of progress on rebuilding infrastructure and services.... could get more violent over the next quarter..
Gulf states. The GCC states, apart from Bahrain, will see milder forms of protest over the next quarter: Oman. Qaboos bin Said Al-Bu Said will feel he can handle this but will need to do more than reshuffle his cabinet and throw a little more money into government programmes. Kuwait, UAE & Qatar: There are vulnerabilities in Kuwait where the Shia community (perhaps 25% of the population) is underrepresented and where relations between the government and parliament are fractious. Kuwait has the wealth and the systems to manage its way through its problems though they could become more visible (but not more serious) over the next quarter. .... small step towards greater political consultation, more representative assembly... Saudi Arabia. King Abdallah is feeling nervous and has announced major increases in salaries and benefits. Satellite television and social networks are leading to rapid change (the latter were highly visible in elections for town councils in 2007, and Twitter accounts increased by 250% in 2010); and there have been protests over issues such as local maladministration leading to deaths in floods. The powerful security services have the resources to pre-empt problems and the demand for change is, as yet, restrained. There are small groups calling for political reform but Saudi Arabia is a deeply conservative society and it is not certain that change, when it comes, will be in the liberal direction seen elsewhere. There is an early test: a 'day of rage' has been called for Riyadh on March 11 and March 20. Over the next quarter, the main impact on Saudi Arabia and its GCC neighbours will come from the loss of key allies, such as Mubarak, and the potential for instability as regimes, especially Yemen's, (and) Bahrain are threatened. If the internal situation there gets out if hand, Riyadh might respond by sending in its National Guard to shore it up. Yet it would have to think carefully about the impact on its Shia minority, which has close links with the Bahraini Shia, and also about Iran's response. The Saudi regime may feel quite isolated..... at this moment of potential crisis in the region, Saudi leadership is weakened and could be undermined still further if there are problems within the ruling family over succession.
Palestinians. The Palestinian National Authority, weakened by its poor performance and the division with Hamas, has been further damaged by revelations (the leaked 'Palestine Papers') on the scale of concessions it has offered to Israel. Salam Fayyad has proposed forming a national unity government with Hamas. The next few months will test the seriousness and plausibility of this proposal.
Lebanon. The depth of Lebanon's problems remains and Hizbollah may feel it has already been through its revolution and could benefit from the impact on its opponents..... "
[NOTE: The 'triumvirate' of Feltman, Bandar bin Sultan & Hariri seem to be betting on what Bandar has inculcated in Hariri, namely that the 'natural flow in things point to turmoil in Damascus...' Once again, they are fashioning on all out popular assault on March14, with Sunni huffing & puffing in Northern Lebanon. From the looks of it, we believe we are in for a protracted 'impasse' ... Bashar al Assad will wait them out, and once the stars align themselves into perfect position, chicken-kung-pao! As things look now, we believe that, depending on the Northern huffing-and-puffing, a repeat of ....well, you've guessed it, May-Day!]
Posted by G, Z, or B at 7:52 PM
Uprooted Palestinian
No comments:
Post a Comment