Syria can deal 'tit for
tat'
[National
Interest] "... Turkey’s
intelligence-collection capabilities are limited, making target selection
difficult and the possibility of air strikes remote. While it could have sent
military aircraft to strike Syrian sites, Syria’s capable air defenses
complicated the decision. Turkey remembers very well what Syrian air defenses
can do to a Turkish fighter jet, and the potential for casualties factored into
Turkey’s response.Erdogan and other AKP officials have periodically
floated a buffer zone, and in theory, Turkey might have taken advantage of this
opportunity to follow through on its oft-repeated threat. Turkey could have
argued it needed to invade to push Syrian artillery out of range of Turkish
cities and villages. However, deploying ground forces over five civilian deaths
would have thrust Turkey even deeper into the Syrian conflict and risked moving too far out in front of its
Western and Arab allies. The Erdogan government alone simply could
not risk igniting full-scale conflict with Syria, nor could it risk being reined
in by the intervention-wary members of NATO.
The Turkish response likely will
continue to be tit-for-tat artillery strikes alongside interventionist
rhetoric—feinting to help reestablish deterrence. The response fits neatly into a narrative of
proportionality and helps assuage domestic frustration with the AKP’s handling
of the crisis. Turkey appears intent on managing tensions with Syria and
preventing them from dragging Turkey into Syria’s internal conflict. Thus,
Turkey may have wisely cloaked its narrow retaliatory options in the language of
proportionality.
Though the threat of escalation remains remote and the
government seems committed to avoiding war, Turkey still faces an impossible
situation: its involvement in the Syrian conflict deepens as its policy options
fail to broaden. In part, this reflects forces outside Turkey’s control. Within
NATO, Turkey invoked Article IV, and the ambassadors released a joint statement
condemning Syrian aggression. However, the alliance has shown little appetite
for intervention, and Turkey has refrained from invoking Article V, which would
obligate NATO to aid in Turkey’s defense, though not necessarily result in a
NATO decision to use military force. The United States, for its part, has
refused direct Turkish appeals to support the Syrian conflict
militarily.
However, Turkey’s precarious
situation stems in part from circumstances of its own making. Caught
up in its growing regional stature and increasingly fond of liberal
internationalism’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, the AKP government
miscalculated deeply in threatening independent action in Syria earlier this
year. Such bluster without the considerable tools
necessary to carry out its threats constituted a major error in the AKP
government’s foreign policy. Turkey’s wisely tempered response to
Syria’s brazen downing of the Turkish F-4 merely accentuated the incongruity of
its threats and capabilities. Thus, when Syria struck again and killed
civilians, Turkey’s unexecuted threats necessitated a response—if only to
maintain a shred of credibility.
Ankara’s options were limited from the
outset, but breakdowns in relations with regional
neighbors have exacerbated the problem....
Since the Mavi Marmara
incident in which Israeli forces clashed with Turkish civilians—killing
nine—aboard a ship attempting to break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip,
Turkey has downgraded relations, primarily over Israel’s unwillingness to
apologize...... the costs to Turkey have mounted as well. Without access to
Israeli military technology, Turkey relies even more heavily on the United
States, which contributed minimally in the latest flare-up between Turkey and
Syria.
... While military confrontation was always unlikely, Assad has appeared unconcerned with Turkish threats on
numerous occasions. Damascus quietly dismissed Turkey’s loud
proclamations on possible unilateral intervention—eroding the threat of credible
action and undermining Ankara’s overall policy objectives. The shelling,
therefore, should not be viewed as the precursor to war but as Turkey enacting
the most limited means of reprisal...."
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