Turkish soldiers in a military vehicle patrol on the Turkish-Syrian border near the village of Hacipasa in Hatay province, southern Turkey 11 October 2012. (Photo: Reuters - Osman Orsal)
The Turkish government is daily repeating aggressive statements and threats to the Syrian regime, such as demanding the Syrian president to resign and even military threats – as happened lately after a Syrian mortar killed three Turks near the border inside Turkey.
However, Turkey is still not able to intervene in a direct and more powerful way and this is not the first time Turkey faces such a contradiction between its rhetoric and actions, as happened in 2010 when Israeli forces killed 11 Turks during the “Gaza flotilla attack.”
This dilemma appears because the Justice and Development Party (AKP) exists under the following factors: Ottoman’s historical glory, rejection from the Europeans, the geo-strategic visions of Ahmet Davutoğlu (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and, most importantly, the AKP’s need for a religious–revolutionary rhetoric to mobilize the Turkish people in order to control power away from military elites’ restrictions and national parties’ influence. This means that the AKP ignored for a period the structural elements, especially the regional balance of power, and that has made the party lose its credibility over time.
Theoretically there are two main approaches, the first emphasizes the priority of the structure and objective conditions which determine the behavior of the agent, as the balance of power and the nature of regional system. For example, Soli Özel (Istanbul Kadir Has University) argues that “Undoubtedly, the actors do shape their environment, but not at will. They are circumscribed by their capacities, by other actors’ relative power, and the conditions created by major shifts in that environment.” The second approach gives priority to the agent who influences the structure and shapes it; the structure is not more than the sum of the actions of the agents. For that, the most important aspect of the agent’s behavior is its identity, internal system, strategic culture, values and ambitions.
This structure-agent debate can contribute to understanding the current crisis in Turkish foreign policy, as it faces many restrictions and obstacles – as is evident in the tensions with Syria and Israel. In the Israeli case, it was interesting to notice that as Turkey became more aggressive towards Israel it becomes closer to the US and NATO, which makes it rhetoric against Israel suspicious. This not to say that Turkey is just a “Western proxy,” it differs in this aspect from some Arab regimes, but rather that Turkey is a regional power with wide national interests in Eurasia and clear ambition for regional leadership and for that it seeks to cooperate, coordinate and integrate with Western polices in the Middle East.
However, some Western powers demand Turkey, as a regional power, to engage more and hold more responsibility in the Syrian crisis. Anne-Marie Slaughter (former director of policy planning in the US State Department) criticized Turkey when it called for an international conference titled “Friends of Syria”, because of its weak and reactive and rhetorical policy that is based merely on diplomacy and words without actions. States that are eager to enjoy the trappings of great-power status – with the assumption that they must be consulted on major events or crises in their regions – must accept the burdens that go with it. They must be prepared not just to talk, but to act, she concluded.
After controlling the internal political game and testing the balance of regional power, especially with the rise of the Russian and Chinese regional roles and the growing tensions with Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Iran, Kurds and Iraq, AKP’s government is now more concerned with focusing on structural elements – mainly strategic calculations for the power game in the Middle East. This development led analysts such as Asli Aydintasbas (columnist for the Turkish daily Milliyet) to argue that “Turkey’s Syria policy will remain rhetoric in the absence of a clear international consensus regarding further action.”
Furthermore, Turkey within such a regional environment will seek for strategic partnership with new Arab regimes as Egypt, and with the NATO.
This harmony between Turkey and NATO contradicts Israeli’s predictions at the beginning of their crisis with Ankara that Turkey is shifting away from the West. Efraim Inbar (Director of Begin-Sadat Center, BESA) warned in series of articles after the “Gaza flotilla attack,” that Turkish understandings with Islamic powers such as Iran, Syria and “resistance” movements, will change the balance of power within the Middle East, reduce the Western influence in the region, weaken NATO, and threaten oil routes to the West. This Israeli campaign was aiming to mobilize the West against the AKP and to isolate Ankara, because the Israelis were confused and concerned about the Turkish shift and US withdrawal from Iraq.
In conclusion, Turkey is using mainly its soft power and not its hard power in order to extend its influence and leadership in the region, and for that Turkey is using growing Islamic discourse which is deviating gradually toward sectarianism. As for the Syrian crisis, Turkey is and will continue to focus on diplomacy, statements and covert actions. Though this will not lead to defeating the Syrian regime, it will enhance Turkey’s legitimacy and attract more followers and supporters in the region. The current Turkish role is a reflection of the US decline in the region and the Western need to form a regional Sunni coalition to balance against Iran. It seems that the Middle East contains more than one “Israel.”
Hosam Matar is a Lebanese researcher of International Relations.
The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect al-Akhbar's editorial policy.
River to Sea
Uprooted Palestinian 
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!
However, Turkey is still not able to intervene in a direct and more powerful way and this is not the first time Turkey faces such a contradiction between its rhetoric and actions, as happened in 2010 when Israeli forces killed 11 Turks during the “Gaza flotilla attack.”
This dilemma appears because the Justice and Development Party (AKP) exists under the following factors: Ottoman’s historical glory, rejection from the Europeans, the geo-strategic visions of Ahmet Davutoğlu (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and, most importantly, the AKP’s need for a religious–revolutionary rhetoric to mobilize the Turkish people in order to control power away from military elites’ restrictions and national parties’ influence. This means that the AKP ignored for a period the structural elements, especially the regional balance of power, and that has made the party lose its credibility over time.
Theoretically there are two main approaches, the first emphasizes the priority of the structure and objective conditions which determine the behavior of the agent, as the balance of power and the nature of regional system. For example, Soli Özel (Istanbul Kadir Has University) argues that “Undoubtedly, the actors do shape their environment, but not at will. They are circumscribed by their capacities, by other actors’ relative power, and the conditions created by major shifts in that environment.” The second approach gives priority to the agent who influences the structure and shapes it; the structure is not more than the sum of the actions of the agents. For that, the most important aspect of the agent’s behavior is its identity, internal system, strategic culture, values and ambitions.
This structure-agent debate can contribute to understanding the current crisis in Turkish foreign policy, as it faces many restrictions and obstacles – as is evident in the tensions with Syria and Israel. In the Israeli case, it was interesting to notice that as Turkey became more aggressive towards Israel it becomes closer to the US and NATO, which makes it rhetoric against Israel suspicious. This not to say that Turkey is just a “Western proxy,” it differs in this aspect from some Arab regimes, but rather that Turkey is a regional power with wide national interests in Eurasia and clear ambition for regional leadership and for that it seeks to cooperate, coordinate and integrate with Western polices in the Middle East.
However, some Western powers demand Turkey, as a regional power, to engage more and hold more responsibility in the Syrian crisis. Anne-Marie Slaughter (former director of policy planning in the US State Department) criticized Turkey when it called for an international conference titled “Friends of Syria”, because of its weak and reactive and rhetorical policy that is based merely on diplomacy and words without actions. States that are eager to enjoy the trappings of great-power status – with the assumption that they must be consulted on major events or crises in their regions – must accept the burdens that go with it. They must be prepared not just to talk, but to act, she concluded.
After controlling the internal political game and testing the balance of regional power, especially with the rise of the Russian and Chinese regional roles and the growing tensions with Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Iran, Kurds and Iraq, AKP’s government is now more concerned with focusing on structural elements – mainly strategic calculations for the power game in the Middle East. This development led analysts such as Asli Aydintasbas (columnist for the Turkish daily Milliyet) to argue that “Turkey’s Syria policy will remain rhetoric in the absence of a clear international consensus regarding further action.”
Furthermore, Turkey within such a regional environment will seek for strategic partnership with new Arab regimes as Egypt, and with the NATO.
This harmony between Turkey and NATO contradicts Israeli’s predictions at the beginning of their crisis with Ankara that Turkey is shifting away from the West. Efraim Inbar (Director of Begin-Sadat Center, BESA) warned in series of articles after the “Gaza flotilla attack,” that Turkish understandings with Islamic powers such as Iran, Syria and “resistance” movements, will change the balance of power within the Middle East, reduce the Western influence in the region, weaken NATO, and threaten oil routes to the West. This Israeli campaign was aiming to mobilize the West against the AKP and to isolate Ankara, because the Israelis were confused and concerned about the Turkish shift and US withdrawal from Iraq.
In conclusion, Turkey is using mainly its soft power and not its hard power in order to extend its influence and leadership in the region, and for that Turkey is using growing Islamic discourse which is deviating gradually toward sectarianism. As for the Syrian crisis, Turkey is and will continue to focus on diplomacy, statements and covert actions. Though this will not lead to defeating the Syrian regime, it will enhance Turkey’s legitimacy and attract more followers and supporters in the region. The current Turkish role is a reflection of the US decline in the region and the Western need to form a regional Sunni coalition to balance against Iran. It seems that the Middle East contains more than one “Israel.”
Hosam Matar is a Lebanese researcher of International Relations.
The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect al-Akhbar's editorial policy.
River to Sea
Uprooted Palestinian 
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!
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