From what we have seen so far, Salam seems to completely ignore certain political realities which can be said to be equivalent to certain articles of the constitution, particularly when it comes to governing the country. (Photo: Bilal Jawich)
Prime minister-designate Tammam Salam’s reading of his appointment to form a government is increasingly running counter to reality on the ground.
He interpreted the near-unanimous support he received in parliament from all the political parties as a sign of weakness on the part of March 8, and particularly Hezbollah, which he believes is not in a position to oppose him
He also misread his follow Beirutis’ enthusiastic support for his appointment, believing it was due to their desire for an alternative Sunni leader to the Hariris. In fact, the capital’s residents – who hail from all sects – welcomed Salam’s selection, hoping he would play the critical role of building bridges across Lebanon’s fractured political landscape.
Having experienced the selection process firsthand, Salam should be fully aware that the Saudis were behind his appointment. Therefore, he should have no illusions about the role they want him to play in advancing their interests in Syria and Lebanon, particularly in confronting Iran and its allies in the region.
From what we have seen so far, Salam seems to completely ignore certain political realities which can be said to be equivalent to – if not more important than – certain articles of the constitution, particularly when it comes to governing the country. He has therefore erred on two counts:
1) The transfer of executive powers from the president to the cabinet as was stipulated in the Taif Accords that ended the Lebanese civil war means that neither the prime minister, nor the president, are capable of governing the country without striking deals with those political forces that carry weight in parliament and on the popular level.
Simply put, Salam must engage all the parties he needs to form a stable and effective government, finding common ground with them on the key issues facing the country.
2) It is true that Salam has the support of Riyadh and Washington externally – as well as March 14, Walid Jumblatt, and the president internally – but Lebanon’s recent experience has shown repeatedly that without some semblance of balance in representation, no government has much of a chance of survival.
The prime minister-designate must understand that what Lebanon needs at the moment is a government that can avoid – or, at the very least, postpone – a major internal explosion, with the hope that some favorable regional developments will come along and spare the country such a fate.
All attempts to ignore such a reality – and living in the illusion that you can represent other people’s interests despite them – is but an invitation to the opposition to mutiny as they did on 7 May 2008 or when they pulled out of the Saad Hariri government.
All the rest is meaningless chatter!
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
He interpreted the near-unanimous support he received in parliament from all the political parties as a sign of weakness on the part of March 8, and particularly Hezbollah, which he believes is not in a position to oppose him
He also misread his follow Beirutis’ enthusiastic support for his appointment, believing it was due to their desire for an alternative Sunni leader to the Hariris. In fact, the capital’s residents – who hail from all sects – welcomed Salam’s selection, hoping he would play the critical role of building bridges across Lebanon’s fractured political landscape.
Having experienced the selection process firsthand, Salam should be fully aware that the Saudis were behind his appointment. Therefore, he should have no illusions about the role they want him to play in advancing their interests in Syria and Lebanon, particularly in confronting Iran and its allies in the region.
From what we have seen so far, Salam seems to completely ignore certain political realities which can be said to be equivalent to – if not more important than – certain articles of the constitution, particularly when it comes to governing the country. He has therefore erred on two counts:
1) The transfer of executive powers from the president to the cabinet as was stipulated in the Taif Accords that ended the Lebanese civil war means that neither the prime minister, nor the president, are capable of governing the country without striking deals with those political forces that carry weight in parliament and on the popular level.
Simply put, Salam must engage all the parties he needs to form a stable and effective government, finding common ground with them on the key issues facing the country.
2) It is true that Salam has the support of Riyadh and Washington externally – as well as March 14, Walid Jumblatt, and the president internally – but Lebanon’s recent experience has shown repeatedly that without some semblance of balance in representation, no government has much of a chance of survival.
The prime minister-designate must understand that what Lebanon needs at the moment is a government that can avoid – or, at the very least, postpone – a major internal explosion, with the hope that some favorable regional developments will come along and spare the country such a fate.
All attempts to ignore such a reality – and living in the illusion that you can represent other people’s interests despite them – is but an invitation to the opposition to mutiny as they did on 7 May 2008 or when they pulled out of the Saad Hariri government.
All the rest is meaningless chatter!
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
Uprooted Palestinian
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this Blog!
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