Via Friday-lunch-Club
Haaretz/ here
"........ Chilton, who as a teenager was a surfer in Southern California, deserves to be called Kevin Spacey - he is a veteran of both NASA and the Air Force space command, wearing the wings of an astronaut who peered down at Earth during three space voyages. He well understands the anxiety in Israel. His hosts brought him, as usual, to Yad Vashem. But in his conversation with Israel Air Force commander Ido Nehushtan and Deputy Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, Chilton didn't offer even a hint of readiness to engage in any operational coordination against their mutual rival. On the contrary: He wondered if it might somehow be possible to persuade Iran to abandon its effort to develop nuclear arms, in order to stave off an aggressive confrontation. Chilton may have been joking when he said that each senior command echelon in the United States has an even more senior command echelon above it - with the only exception being Mrs. Barack Obama - but when it comes to vital matters of foreign affairs and defense, one should never misinterpret: The general expressed Obama's desire to delay the inevitable.
Iran is definitely in Obama's sights. He has ceased courting it, and is girding for the confrontation. But not yet. Evidently, it will not be this year. Thus, if Netanyahu wants to attack Iran, he's going to have to take into account four major indices: substantive need, operational capability, internal support and external consent. Only the confluence of extremely high scores in all four of these areas would allow him to spearhead the decision to launch an operation.
As far as substantive need goes, as of last month, Iran did not yet have nuclear arms. Public pronouncements by senior U.S. intelligence and Pentagon officials more or less corroborate the assessments in Israel.....
Another prerequisite for an Israeli attack, which has prevailed for years, is the state of hostility between Israel and Iran on the terror front, but it is not sufficient by itself to justify a strike. Iran has attacked Israel relentlessly through its proxies in Hezbollah, Hamas and other organizations, via financing, training and direct supervision by the Revolutionary Guard and the foreign terrorist attack division of Iranian intelligence. Israel does not make do with indulgent acceptance of the Iranian attacks. If the Mossad indeed assassinated Mahmoud al-Mabhouh of Hamas in Dubai, the motive most probably had less to do with the past than with the present - namely, with his recent role as a Hamas liaison with Iran, rather than as revenge for the murder of soldiers Ilan Saadon and Avi Sasportas two decades ago.
As for capability: Prior to making a decision on the question of launching an operation against Iran, Netanyahu would need an unequivocal statement from the defense establishment that Israel possesses the military ability to hit targets and accomplish the objectives that will be set, at least in relative terms (i.e., wreaking damage that could be reversed in a few years, as opposed to total destruction from which there could be no recovery). ....At any given moment, one can reasonably conclude that there is no unity of opinion among the officers who would be consulted, either when it comes to assessments and or recommendations. Among Gen. Nehushtan's predecessors, Eliezer Shkedi was more belligerent on the Iranian question than Dan Halutz. Seasoned defense officials are aware that special operations, such as the assassination of Mabhouh (if it was indeed carried out by Israel), do not necessarily reflect an army's or nation's capability in war. The attacker always has a momentary and fleeting advantage that does not reflect his capacity to defend and absorb. The Israel that carried out assassinations of Black September operatives in Europe in 1973, for example, was not adequately prepared for the Yom Kippur War.
As for the subject of domestic support, Netanyahu is bleeding, said one of his political rivals this week, no matter what the polls may say. The capitulation of a majority of the cabinet and of the Knesset is preventing an all-out crash, but is not sufficient for him to be able to soar. There is no reverence for the premier. Without an ample measure of political prowess, security leadership and moral authority, you do not take a country into an initiated war, a war of choice.
In terms of external consent, Gens. Chilton and Petraeus and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, who met Ashkenazi in Brussels last week, have an influence on Obama, but primarily are attentive to his policy, which is mainly concerned this year with stabilizing the economy, disconnecting from Iraq, fighting more effectively in Afghanistan, and easing tension with China and Russia - partly for the purpose of tightening the ring around Iran. The American military sees Iran and North Korea as "regional aggressors" that threaten to spur a nuclear race and to undermine stability at two edges of Asia. The conflict with one of the two, with preference for Iran, is growing closer, but is still possible to prevent.The spokesman of the Obama administration's National Security Council, Mike Hammer, last month described the transition from dialogue with Tehran to sanctions against it as the "pressure track." Last year was the year of public relations; 2010 is the year of pressure. The crushing blow that comes after the pressure will not be dealt before next year.
Petraeus, in speaking about Iraq and Afghanistan, recently referred to the difference between "Washington time" and "Baghdad, or Kabul, time": Iranian nuclearization is conducted according to Tehran time, but Obama takes a look at the Washington clock and sees in it the congressional elections in November.
During the waiting period, until 2011 arrives, Israel can intensify its intelligence capability, spruce up its military power, and it would also be wise to place at its head a political leadership that can be relied upon."
Posted by G, Z, or B at 8:32 PM
'Regime Change' in Iran? No thanks ...
"Democratically elected Mossadeg in court at his bogus trial..."
In FP/ here" .... History shows that intervention is easier said than done. Past U.S. attempts to sway Iranian internal affairs -- such as the CIA-fomented 1953 coup d'état against a democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh -- have proven costly for U.S. interests. Most notably, Washington's support for the shah fueled the 1979 Islamic Revolution, inspiring anti-Western movements in Pakistan, Egypt, and beyond.To make matters worse, due to its absence from the scene during the last 30 years, the United States is not sufficiently equipped to understand and shape what appears to be a titanic struggle between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his opponents.But between the extremes of doing nothing and doing everything, there is a middle ground: providing the Iranian pro-democracy movement with breathing space, rather than engaging in risky and imprecise exercises that would directly involve America as an actor on the Iranian scene. The United States can achieve this through a few simple steps.
(continue/ here)
Posted by G, Z, or B at 8:06 PMRiver to Sea
Uprooted Palestinian
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